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NO. 32 APRIL 2021 Introduction 
Nord Stream 2 – Germany’s Dilemma 
Kirsten Westphal 
The Nord Stream 2 project presents the German government with the dilemma of 
choosing between energy and foreign policy interests. Geopolitical arguments often 
prevail in the political discourse. Yet, a weighing of priorities requires a look at the 
energy policy context, too. When it comes to balancing interests, there are no easy or 
“cheap” answers. With a focus on the energy context, it has to be emphasized that a 
cooperative approach toward energy transformation promises the greatest dividend 
for a balance of interests, but it presupposes a minimum consensus within the Euro-
pean Union (EU), along with the United States (US), Ukraine, and Russia. 
 
By mid-April 2021, there were still nearly 
130 km missing from the Nord Stream 2 
pipeline (100 km in Denmark and 30 km in 
Germany), which stretches from Russia to 
Germany through the Baltic Sea and is built 
in two strings of 1,230 km each. US sanc-
tions had halted construction work for more 
than a year starting in December 2019. 
As a result of the sanctions, the continued 
construction, insurance, and certification 
of the pipeline is now a Russian matter. 
The package of US sanctions (Countering 
America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions 
Act [CAATSA], the Protecting Europe’s 
Energy Security Act [PEESA], and the Protect-
ing Europe’s Energy Security Clarification 
Act [PEESCA]) has led to the withdrawal of 
many European companies. The US sanc-
tions are designed to stop construction. 
This has brought the situation between 
Moscow and Washington to a head – a 
highly charged situation that threatens to 
end with at least one losing face, forcing 
the German government to take a political 
stance. 
Foreign Policy Changes 
Nord Stream 2 was launched by Gazprom 
and five European companies in 2015, one 
year after the annexation of Crimea. In its 
dealings with the project, the German gov-
ernment took a fallback position early on, 
relying on existing German law and an eco-
nomic-technical position, and therefore it 
classified the expansion of Nord Stream as a 
commercial project. Nord Stream 2 strength-
ens the industrial location and the German 
gas market. In doing so, the German gov-
ernment followed the paradigm of separat-
ing trade and politics and sees economic in-
terdependence not as a problem for its own 
security, but as a basis for balancing interests. 
The “compartmentalization” propagated 
by Germany, i.e., framing the issue as a 
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purely economic question, was shared 
neither by the EU Commission nor by many 
other EU member states, which assessed the 
issue differently in the context of national 
(energy) security and the creation of the 
Energy Union. These (geo)political dimen-
sions (SWP Research Paper 3/2017) were not 
given enough consideration by the German 
government. Berlin resisted a transfer of 
competences to Brussels for a long time, 
thereby missing the chance to hand over 
the controversial topic of Nord Stream 2 
to Brussels. Then, in April 2019, the EU’s 
internal market rules were extended to 
pipelines entering the Union from third 
countries. This amendment to the Gas 
Directive transforms highly political issues 
into administrative action. Although this 
means that the issues at hand are less likely 
to be politicized, it also limits the scope of 
political action available to member states. 
As the landfall state, it is now up to Ger-
many – in coordination with the EU – to 
regulate the section of the pipeline through 
German territorial waters. However, it 
quickly became apparent that the EU mem-
ber states had only reached a consensus on 
the wording of the text, but not on the sub-
stance. 
Much has changed in the environment 
since the project was initiated: The five 
European companies initially withdrew 
from the investment under pressure from 
the Polish antitrust authorities and instead 
pledged financial investments of up to €950 
million each. Transparency is an obvious 
casualty of political pressure. 
More importantly, German-Russian rela-
tions have deteriorated recently due to the 
Navalny case, the aggravated situation in 
eastern Ukraine, and Russia’s disinforma-
tion campaign against Germany. Thus, 
this pipeline deal no longer functions as 
an element for easing tensions – not only 
because of the repercussions on Ukraine. 
Instead, as political science argues, energy 
and foreign relations often reinforce each 
other in their tendency toward cooperation 
or conflict. This is precisely why Berlin hopes 
that the construction of Nord Stream 2 keeps 
costs high on the further deterioration of 
relations. Indeed, all this raises the issue 
of a continued downward spiral in energy 
relations, where both sides are asymmetri-
cally but mutually vulnerable. Ultimately, 
dealing with trade has also become a geo-
political issue in a world characterized by 
strategic rivalries and systemic competition, 
in which trade and exchange have become 
political currency and supply chains are 
subject to normatively underpinned loyalty 
or antagonism. 
Since mid-2015, Berlin’s relationship 
with Washington has not been unaffected 
by trends and changes of course in the US: 
Although Berlin, or rather Brussels, con-
tinued to impose sanctions against Russia 
in coordination with the Obama adminis-
tration, this changed fundamentally during 
Trump’s presidency. Sanctions against 
Russia (and other energy-rich states) gained 
their own momentum, driven in part by 
domestic politics in reaction to Russia’s 
interference in the US elections in 2016, 
but also by then-President Trump himself 
as an element of the trade conflict and dis-
pute over defense spending in NATO, and 
also as an expression of US energy domi-
nance. Although the thrust of unilateral 
sanctions is clear (to stop the project), the 
range of motives is broad and the actual 
goal of the sanctions – to achieve a change 
in behavior of the target – has been lost 
from the focus. The secondary effects and 
externalized costs of these unilateral sanc-
tions for Germany and the EU were accepted 
as collateral damage, while the US itself con-
tinued to import oil from Russia in order 
to be able to sanction Venezuela and Iran 
(SWP Comment 6/2019, SWP-Studie 28/ 
2019). After Joe Biden took office on Janu-
ary 20, 2021, a small window for compro-
mise around Nord Stream 2 opened, but it 
seemed to quickly close due to congressional 
pressure. Secretary of State Antony Blinken 
then said the project was “a bad idea” and 
contrary to EU interests – as well as US 
security interests – during his inaugural 
visit to Brussels on March 24. The basic 
tenor of the Biden administration is more 
cooperative, but also more normative: It is 
about restoring the transatlantic relation-
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ship and a shared attitude toward authori-
tarian regimes. Beyond the short-term twists 
and turns, a realignment with Washington 
remains no easy matter because, although 
interests coincide in the systemic competi-
tion with China, Europe’s exposure is dis-
proportionately higher in the geo-economic 
disruptions, as well as in the energy trade. 
The shock of the confrontation with Presi-
dent Trump endures, as does the realization 
that the US remains a deeply divided coun-
try and that its energy wealth sets it apart 
from the EU in terms of energy policy. 
Germany is in a predicament: Russia 
severely undermines the security situation 
in Europe, and US sanctions make the pipe-
line a matter of national sovereignty. Oppo-
sition in the EU to the pipeline masks the 
fact that Washington is also undermining 
Brussels’ powerful instrument of regula-
tion; broader questions concerning the stra-
tegic energy capacity to act with and vis-à-
vis the US also arise for the EU (SWP Com-
ment 7/2021). The August 2020 demarche to 
Washington by 24 EU member states gave 
voice to this concern. Thus, political posi-
tions have hardened since 2015. In the fol-
lowing, this Comment will take a closer 
look at the energy context, which has 
equally changed since then. 
Energy Security 
The two additional lines of Nord Stream 2 
do not pose a threat to European energy 
security, nor are they indispensable for the 
security of gas supply. Since the project is 
contextualized geopolitically in a hybrid 
threat scenario for Europe and even the 
US, it is worth taking a broader view of the 
energy context, looking first at geography, 
geology, infrastructure capacities, and sup-
ply volumes, and second at the gas con-
sumption pattern. 
On a strictly economic basis, Nord 
Stream 2 doubles the transport capacity 
through the Baltic Sea by 55 billion cubic-
meters (bcm) and connects the newly devel-
oped deposits on the Yamal Peninsula with 
the major gas markets in Europe via a route 
that is approximately 1,000 km shorter, 
more modern, and more efficient than the 
one through Ukraine. 
Gas production in the United Kingdom 
(UK), Denmark, the Netherlands, and Ger-
many has fallen by more than half between 
2009 and 2019, to 76.2 billion cubic meters 
(bcm). The large Dutch gas field in Groningen 
will cease production altogether in 2022. 
Northwest Europe is Gazprom’s most im-
portant sales market, with the UK and Ger-
many being the biggest customers with 
around 57 bcm (2019). Production in the EU 
has fallen faster and to a greater extent than 
was assumed in the 2017 Prognos study, 
which formed the basis for the Nord Stream 
2 plan approval procedure. The study only 
assumes a reduction of 41 bcm by 2025. 
The Prognos study forecasted imports of 
376 bcm from the EU28, plus Switzerland 
and western Ukraine, for 2020. In reality, 
total net imports of around 407 bcm were 
already significantly higher in 2019. Ac-
cordingly, about 170 bcm were purchased 
from Russia. 
Geology also plays a role at the Russian 
end of the pipelines, as the old gas fields 
of the Nadym-Pur-Taz region have passed 
their peak production levels. In contrast, 
production levels on the Yamal Peninsula 
are growing. Thus, Gazprom has to manage 
the gas fields (and their depletion) with a 
view to exports and consumption. The main 
export sources as well as routes are shifting 
primarily to the north, or from eastern 
Siberia to China, if the “Power of Siberia” – 
with an annual capacity of 38 bcm – is 
included in the picture. The huge capacities 
at the Yamal Peninsula are also a reason 
why China and Russia are negotiating the 
“Power of Siberia 2,” which has a capacity 
of 50 bcm from western Siberia. 
It is, of course, in theory correct that the 
EU, Ukraine, and the Western Balkans and 
Turkey could also be supplied via the exist-
ing pipeline network. The old gas pipeline 
system through Ukraine has a nominal 
capacity of 146 bcm per annum, the Yamal-
Europe pipeline through Poland and Bela-
rus 33 billion m3, and Nord Stream 55 bcm 
of gas from Russia. In addition, there 
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are pipelines to Turkey: TurkStream with 
31.5 bcm, Blue Stream with 16 bcm, and a 
small pipeline to Finland. Even without the 
additional 55 bcm of Nord Stream 2, there 
are no pipeline bottlenecks. This is, how-
ever, a very simplistic view. 
The connecting pipelines from Greifs-
wald into Germany are in operation and 
function as an integral part of the gas net-
work. These pipelines are regulated and 
have been part of the German Network 
Development Plan as well as a European-
wide market survey (in the case of the Euro-
pean Gas Pipeline Link [EUGAL]). Yet, if 
Nord Stream 2 does not come on stream, 
these investments are partly stranded costs 
that may put a burden on gas consumers. 
The Ostsee-Pipeline-Anbindungsleitung 
(OPAL) has been reduced to only half of its 
pipeline capacity following a ruling by the 
General Court of the EU in September 2019 
that was issued after a complaint by Poland. 
In addition, the European Gas Pipeline Link 
(EUGAL) has been available since April 
2021 and offers a capacity of 55 bcm. The 
connecting Gazela pipeline can transport 
around 30 bcm via the Czech Republic to 
Waidhaus, the old entry point to Germany 
through which the volumes were imported 
via Ukraine. 
However, the expansion of transport 
capacities does not automatically mean that 
more gas would be purchased from Gaz-
prom. The decisive factors for gas purchases 
are, in fact, Gazprom’s own sales strategy as 
well as existing long-term contracts with 
their take-or-pay clauses, i.e., the volumes 
that the buyers must pay for in any case 
and will therefore also purchase. In addi-
tion, “nominations” are made according to 
price signals, i.e., orders are placed where 
the cheapest gas can be obtained. This is 
why the shares of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) deliveries to Europe have fluctuated 
in recent years. Estimates suggest that, until 
at least 2030, Gazprom has long-term con-
tract supply commitments of around 120 
billion m3, and has thus secured a signifi-
cant market share in Europe, which it must 
also serve. 
Climate Policy Considerations 
The political pressure on Nord Stream 2 is 
even higher because of the fact that it is a 
fossil fuel infrastructure project. The pipe-
line is considered to be a bet by the energy 
companies against European climate pro-
tection. And indeed, in order to achieve 
climate neutrality by 2050, the consump-
tion of natural gas will have to drop mas-
sively. However, scenarios aimed at achiev-
ing the climate target currently diverge 
widely from trend scenarios. The above-
mentioned consumption data also shows 
that there has been no trend reversal in 
gas consumption thus far. 
A dilemma arises between the speed 
of emission reductions and the depth of 
decarbonization when arguing about the 
use of natural gas as a bridge. Natural gas 
replaces coal in the industry and in power 
generation. Because Germany will phase 
out nuclear power in 2022 and coal more 
rapidly than 2038, it is very likely that the 
consumption of natural gas will increase 
over the next decade. Thus, there is a con-
crete question about the security of supply 
in the transition period. In the public debate, 
however, the predominant focus on annual 
import volumes and possible transport 
routes is misleading. For this reason, fluc-
tuations in the seasonal consumption of gas 
will increase massively beyond 2030, with 
monthly gas consumption in Germany 
already being more than three times higher 
in the winter months than in individual 
summer months. In the winter, cold spells 
coincide with so-called Dunkelflaute. An 
assessment that takes an accurate view at 
points in time suggests the need for capac-
ities and flexibilities in the infrastructure. 
In the past, this function was fulfilled by 
storage facilities and gas fields in the EU. 
The latter will soon be missing. During the 
cold spells of 2019 and 2021, pipelines from 
Russia were running at full capacity. The 
cold spell of February 2021 also showed 
that LNG followed a price logic that makes 
Europe the “last resort” of LNG. This means 
nothing other than that much higher prices 
would have to be paid for LNG during a 
 SWP Comment 32 
 April 2021 
 5 
cold snap to divert volumes to Europe: On 
February 19, the LNG spot price in East Asia 
was more than 80 percent higher than the 
gas price in Europe. At the same time, LNG 
exports from the US had also plunged by 
two-thirds in February. Notwithstanding, 
LNG from the US, Russia, or Qatar has 
become an important part of the EU and 
Europe’s gas mix, but for ensuring supply, 
the price – as well as time factor regarding 
when tankers arrive – plays a major role. 
In this respect, more climate protection 
also creates new opportunities but also 
new challenges for security of supply. The 
energy transformation means a phase char-
acterized by high uncertainties and vola-
tilities for the transition period, which will 
in any case put supply relations and the gas 
transmission system under great stress. 
Stopping Nord Stream 2 for climate 
policy reasons would mean a sensitive inter-
vention in the gas value chain. Physically, a 
source of flexibility would be missing, with 
no (see above) direct impact on supply 
volumes, and no corresponding successful 
savings on the demand side. Sometimes, the 
argument is put forward, that it is to pre-
vent the price-dampening effect that the 
pipeline has on German gas customers. Yet, 
if fossil energy is to become more expen-
sive, there are other approaches that have 
less impact on the security of supply. 
If natural gas is to become successively 
more expensive, then creating a physical 
shortage is the wrong step; a price for CO2 
and methane emissions could be set in-
stead. It is correct that methane emissions 
must be monitored along the entire supply 
chain and not just used as an argument for 
or against a modern pipeline through the 
Baltic Sea. Dealing with methane emissions 
and decarbonizing the gas supply chain is 
therefore a very important starting point 
for international cooperation with the 
Biden administration and other partners. 
Integrity of Ukraine 
At the end of 2019, an agreement was 
reached with Russia on gas transport 
through Ukraine. What led to this – 
whether it was US sanctions or negotiating 
and mediating skills – is open to debate. 
However, a breakthrough was achieved 
on gas transport: a new contractual rela-
tionship between Russia and Ukraine that 
complies with EU rules and lays a stable 
and binding contractual foundation until 
the end of 2024. This guarantees Ukraine 
transit revenues of at least $7.2 billion. 
Accordingly, Gazprom booked firm 
transport capacities of 65 bcm in 2020, 
followed by firm capacities of 40 bcm in the 
2021–2024 period. The contract is on daily 
volumes, which does not give seasonal flexi-
bility. These ship-or-pay volumes must be 
paid for independently of the actual service. 
The tariff is significantly higher than on the 
competing Yamal-Europe or Nord Stream 1 
routes, as Ukraine’s system is designed for 
higher volumes. If Gazprom wants to ex-
port more natural gas through Ukraine, it 
would have to book larger transport vol-
umes at even higher prices in the short term. 
2020 has made it clear that Ukraine is 
now increasingly integrated into the Cen-
tral European gas market. The following 
integration steps have been taken by 
Ukraine in recent years: physical and 
virtual gas imports from Slovakia, Poland, 
and Hungary, more price convergence of 
imported gas with European hubs; imple-
mentation of EU network codes; use of its 
gas storage facilities for Eastern Europe due 
to attractive commercial conditions; and 
maintaining gas transport in competition 
with other routes. Ukraine no longer buys 
gas volumes directly from Russia for its own 
consumption, but from the EU. These steps 
actually lead the way ahead and make it 
possible in the first place to participate in 
the EU’s strategic goal – a climate-neutral 
continent by 2050. 
So if more far-reaching compromise solu-
tions are sought now, the main issue dis-
cussed is how to guarantee the transport 
of natural gas from Russia beyond Decem-
ber 31, 2024. Considerations today about 
extending the agreement make sense, but 
they are difficult to implement in detail. 
First, there are good reasons against reopen-
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ing the agreement. Even a potential exten-
sion is difficult, as the issue of gas transport 
tariffs for the next regulatory period of 
2025–2029 shows. Tariffs are unlikely to 
be set by the National Regulatory Authority 
of Ukraine (NEURC) until 2024. Expecting 
Gazprom to reserve capacity already today 
without knowing the tariffs is hard to 
imagine. On the other hand, as suggested 
in a study by IHS Markit, it would be quite 
conceivable to set aggregate annual tariffs, 
e.g., which would then be paid in advance 
by Gazprom into a trust fund managed by 
the EU for a longer period. This would pro-
vide Ukraine with more planning certainty 
for decommissioning pipes or converting 
parts of the system for the transport of 
hydrogen. The old system had a capacity 
of 146 billion m3, which was already only 
partially utilized in 2019 with 89.6 bcm of 
annual transport volume. 
In 2020, Gazprom shipped 55.8 bcm of 
gas, less than the capacity booked (65 bil-
lion m3). ICIS also reports that Gazprom 
booked only slightly more than the daily 
requirement of 109.6 million cubic meters 
in the first four months of 2021 and no 
additional capacities in May 2021. 
In the future, transported volumes 
through Ukraine will remain flat or de-
crease because of changing flow patterns 
in South-East Europe. First, TurkStream, 
which extends from Russia to the European 
side of Turkey, was completed, and since 
January 2021 volumes through Bulgaria 
to Serbia have been delivered through 
the second leg with a capacity of 6 bcm 
and later 8.5 bcm. Moreover, Gazprom 
will reroute gas delivered to Hungary and 
Romania (7.5 bcm in 2020) from Ukraine 
through TurkStream. Second, the Trans 
Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) started its deliveries 
of Azerbaijani gas through Greece and 
Albania to Italy in December 2020. It will 
later also supply one-third of Bulgaria’s gas 
needs when the Greece-Bulgaria intercon-
nector is completed. In addition, there are 
LNG terminals in Revithoussa, Greece, Krk, 
Croatia, and from 2022, Alexandroupolis, 
Greece, as well as similar facilities in Tur-
key. As a result, gas supplies in southeast-
ern Europe have diversified, and purchases 
of Russian natural gas through Ukraine are 
decreasing, not only as a result of the con-
struction of TurkStream and the conse-
quent rerouting of Russian gas, but also due 
to competition from LNG, especially from 
the US. All this together means that Gaz-
prom will be guided by long-term contracts 
with Slovakia, Moldova, and partly Romania, 
which it primarily serves via the Ukraine 
corridor. The past months display that Gaz-
prom is obviously not really willing to book 
extra and expensive capacities via Ukraine. 
The Ukrainian corridor is less competitive 
vis-à-vis the other transport routes into 
Europe. If this remains the case after 2024, 
even if Nord Stream 2 does not come on 
line, there will be fewer additional book-
ings beyond the 40 bcm per year. 
Prospects for Eastern Europe 
Ukraine is important to the configuration 
of gas flows in the region. It stopped buying 
Russian gas directly in 2015 following Rus-
sia’s annexation of Crimea and support for 
armed separatism in eastern Ukraine. It 
began to meet its gas import needs through 
physical and backhaul imports from Cen-
tral Europe, primarily from Slovakia, but 
also from Hungary and Poland. With this 
step, Ukraine became part of the Eastern-
Central European gas market, which, as 
described above, is already largely integrated 
into the EU internal market. 
Geostrategic considerations about the gas 
region between the Baltic Sea, the Adriatic 
Sea, and the Black Sea should acknowledge 
the big success story of EU gas policy: 
The construction of the interconnectors, 
the application of EU regulation and, most 
recently, the implementation of the anti-
trust proceedings against Gazprom have 
brought more competition to the markets 
and more price convergence with the gas 
hubs of northwest Europe. Gazprom’s 
dominant market position has ended. Gas 
flows are changing with an increased role 
of the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, com-
pared to Slovakia and Romania in the past. 
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It is not only Nord Stream 2 itself, but 
also the (energy) political reactions to it that 
cement a certain division in the gas market. 
In the Three Seas Initiative, the Eastern and 
Central European countries are not only 
pursuing a course of North-South intercon-
nection among themselves, but also prim-
arily of integration into the international 
gas market in order to reduce dependence 
on Russia’s Gazprom (SWP-Aktuell 16/2021). 
Although this is an important step for the 
energy sovereignty of the countries, the 
cohesion of the EU gas market must also 
remain in view. It will also be necessary to 
observe whether and how gas flows will 
change from October 1, 2021, with the newly 
established unified German market area 
(Trading Hub Europe, THE) and its new 
tariffs. 
The Polish gas market remains largely 
sealed off from the northwestern European 
market by trade barriers – a consequence 
of Polish energy policy, which focuses on 
the physical substitution of Russian gas vol-
umes by 2022 and has blocked more inter-
connectivity with Germany. Due to these 
barriers and special regulations, the Polish 
market is largely monopolized. This divid-
ing line is politically sought by Warsaw and 
driven by energy economic interests of its 
major incumbent. 
Poland’s gas consumers pay a higher gas 
price for this policy, which is sold politically 
as a contribution to genuine diversification. 
The expansion of gas infrastructure was 
financed with EU funds. At this point, a 
circle closes with regard to the difficult 
balance between climate policy and secu-
rity of supply. Russia has a strong position 
in the EU market. At the same time, there 
is flexibility as well as options to replace a 
(partial) shortfall in volumes in the short 
and medium terms. However, if the energy 
transition does not succeed faster across 
Europe, the high level of dependence on 
Russia will remain, which in turn could 
trigger more LNG infrastructure invest-
ments for diversification. 
In the future, European import demand 
will have to be met mainly by pipeline gas 
from Russia and by LNG mainly from the 
US, Russia (from Novatek and Gazprom), 
and Qatar, as domestic, Algerian, and also 
Norwegian production levels decline or 
level off. It is primarily the LNG supply 
from Qatar that will increase significantly 
on the world market after 2025, from 110 
to 152 bcm per year. Both LNG and Russian 
pipeline gas have a balancing role – on the 
European as well as the global market. 
This sets the EU apart from the US: It has 
a vital interest in gas market cohesion and 
not in a “cordon sanitaire.” Moreover, Russia 
remains not only a neighbor, but also a 
major supplier of energy and raw materials, 
on which an energy transformation will 
have to rely and which has to made part of 
a climate-neutral Europe by 2050. Zero-sum 
games in the gas sector then really lead to 
dead ends. This is because Europe’s energy 
supply presupposes a modus vivendi with 
Moscow. The application of EU regulations 
and market mechanisms has proved to be 
a promising and effective pathway for an 
ever better-functioning and competitive gas 
market. A market approach creates options 
for necessary cooperation on natural gas 
and the energy transition: It would be pos-
sible to negotiate gas supplies from Central 
Asia through Ukraine and a “gas release” in 
the form of, e.g., the auctioning of Russian 
gas volumes via Gazprom’s electronic trad-
ing platform at various entry points. The 
extent to which these options remain pos-
sible – if Nord Stream 2 is stopped for 
external and geopolitical considerations – 
is difficult to assess. However, the shift to 
geopolitics would weaken market mecha-
nisms and close this route (for now). 
Options for Action 
Germany’s dilemma stems from political 
circumstances and the challenge of balanc-
ing economic and foreign policy interests. 
Depending on the political choice, two and 
a half options arise in the context of energy 
policy from the current situation: 1) partici-
pation in the sanctions against Russia to 
stop construction; 2) active flanking of the 
project and search for a compromise. A pas-
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sive wait-and-see approach is not really a 
political option, as US pressure alone forces 
a position. 
Regarding the first option, stopping the 
construction has already proven to not be 
easy for the US, since many activities are 
now being carried out by Russian compa-
nies. Thus, sanctions aimed at stopping the 
pipe-laying activities would result in a con-
frontational situation. Moreover, sanctions 
would need to be executed jointly in the EU 
(and in coordination with the US) without 
violating the norm of non-discrimination. 
There is also the concern of damage claims. 
This approach would require a clear ration-
ale for imposing the sanctions and a con-
sensus in the EU. Sanctions are linked to 
conditions for a change in behavior, which 
must be achievable, otherwise sanctions 
become an end in themselves. Even if oppo-
nents call the situation around the project 
a race and an endgame, such a step would 
be a big bang, but it would be more of an 
opening for a next round (of escalation) 
with no discernible benefits. Who benefits 
from a ruin in the Baltic Sea? If new sanc-
tions are seen as the political way forward, 
then it would be more effective if the EU 
and the US were in lockstep against Russian 
oil supplies. Here, the Kremlin is more vul-
nerable, but also the costs between the EU 
and the US would be more equally dis-
tributed. 
Regarding the second option, the build-
ing blocks for finding a compromise are 
actually obvious: further integrating 
Ukraine into the EU internal energy market, 
not only through synchronizing Ukraine’s 
electricity grid with the EU’s electricity grid, 
but also through the extension of gas trans-
port or its decarbonization. Moreover, the 
region between the Baltic Sea, the Adriatic 
Sea, and the Black Sea is predestined for the 
production of green gases and hydrogen. In 
theory, this is particularly true for Ukraine, 
which could benefit from its geographical 
position: The country has the potential 
to produce green hydrogen, but also blue 
hydrogen (for Europe) from (Russian) natu-
ral gas and store the CO2 captured in the pro-
cess. Ukraine can take a key role in “clean 
gases,” hydrogen, and CO2 capture and 
storage. Yet, this depends on a stable and 
reliable regulatory and investment frame-
work in the country. Furthermore, Ger-
many could become even more involved in 
the Three Seas Initiative. It would also be 
conceivable to extend gas transport through 
Ukraine. 
One of the central ideas from Washing-
ton, however – the emergency brake and 
snapback mechanism – is difficult to im-
plement for at least two reasons. First, there 
is currently no foreseen regulatory mecha-
nism that can be used. Second, the “quid 
pro quo” would not only cost the EU dearly 
in literal terms, but it would also – depend-
ing on its duration – be accompanied 
by massive restrictions on the security of 
supply. 
However, there is still leeway regulatory- 
and time-wise after the completion of the 
pipeline that can be used for political nego-
tiations. There are still stopping points on 
the way to the commissioning of the pipe-
line: the acceptance of the pipeline and the 
implementation of the Gas Directive. Gaz-
prom and the Kremlin will then have to 
disclose which rules they want to play by. 
At what point in time what volumes of 
whose natural gas will then actually flow 
through the pipeline and who operates it 
are potentially also questions of compro-
mise. 
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